Winner determination for combinatorial auctions for tasks with time and precedence constraints

Güleser K. Demir, Maria Gini

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We present a solution to the winner determination problem which takes into account not only costs but also risk aversion of the agent that accepts the bids, and which works for auctioning tasks that have time and precedence constraints. We use Expected Utility Theory as the basic mechanism for decision-making. Our theoretical and experimental analysis shows that Expected Utility is useful for choosing between cheap-but-risky and costly-but-safe bids. Moreover, we show how bids with similar costs and similar probabilities of being successfully completed but different time windows can be efficiently selected or rejected.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)267-280
Number of pages14
JournalJournal of Intelligent and Fuzzy Systems
Volume18
Issue number3
StatePublished - Sep 3 2007

Keywords

  • Automated auctions
  • Expected utility
  • Multi-agent contracting
  • Risk
  • Winner determination

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