Why do firms go dark? Causes and economic consequences of voluntary SEC deregistrations

Christian Leuz, Alexander Triantis, Tracy Yue Wang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

186 Scopus citations


We examine a comprehensive sample of going-dark deregistrations where companies cease SEC reporting, but continue to trade publicly. We document a spike in going dark that is largely attributable to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Firms experience large negative abnormal returns when going dark. We find that many firms go dark due to poor future prospects, distress and increased compliance costs after SOX. But we also find evidence suggesting that controlling insiders take their firms dark to protect private control benefits and decrease outside scrutiny, particularly when governance and investor protection are weak. Finally, we show that going dark and going private are distinct economic events.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)181-208
Number of pages28
JournalJournal of Accounting and Economics
Issue number2-3
StatePublished - Aug 1 2008


  • Disclosure
  • Going private
  • Governance
  • Pink Sheets
  • Private control benefits
  • Regulation
  • SEC deregistration

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Why do firms go dark? Causes and economic consequences of voluntary SEC deregistrations'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this