When do fair beliefs influence bargaining behavior? Experimental bargaining in Japan and the United States

Nancy R. Buchan, Rachel T.A. Croson, Eric J. Johnson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

67 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this research, we examine the influence of beliefs about fairness on bargaining behavior. Using a repeated ultimatum game, we examine bargaining contexts in Japan and the United States in which buyers' or sellers' fair beliefs are either in alignment with or in conflict with their own self-interest. We suggest that understanding the relationship between fair beliefs and self-interest is central to understanding when fair beliefs will influence bargaining behavior. Our results demonstrate that fair beliefs predict bargaining behavior when they are aligned with one's own self-interest.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)181-190
Number of pages10
JournalJournal of Consumer Research
Volume31
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1 2004
Externally publishedYes

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