Voluntary incentive design for endangered species protection

Rodney B.W. Smith, Jason F. Shogren

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

67 Scopus citations

Abstract

Herein we examine the theory and practical limits of designing a voluntary incentive scheme to protect endangered species on private land. We consider both an ex-ante scheme, in which a contract to the landholder depends only on what the landholder reports, and an ex-post scheme, in which a contract to the landholder depends on reports from all landowners. Except in special cases, the ex-ante scheme never implements the full information allocation, and can actually set aside too much land. In contrast, expected habitat size under the ex-post scheme is smaller than both the ex-ante and full information allocations.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)169-187
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of Environmental Economics and Management
Volume43
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 2002

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
1We are thankful for many helpful suggestions by Jean-Mark Bourgeon, John Tschirhart, the associate editor, and two anonymous referees. Also, we thank seminar participants at the Economic Research Service, USDA; UC Davis, University of Hawaii at Manoa, University of Minnesota, University of Wyoming, and the World Congress. Shogren acknowledges support of the Institute of Environmental and Natural Resources, University of Wyoming. Smith acknowledges support of the Minnesota Agricultural Experiment Station.

Copyright:
Copyright 2017 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

Keywords

  • Asymmetric information
  • Endangered species
  • Mechanism design

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