User acceptance of complex electronic market mechanisms

Role of information feedback

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper broadens the scope of evaluating the design of economic mechanisms that is traditionally done solely from an economic perspective. We introduce and demonstrate the application of acceptability to evaluate complex economic mechanisms. In particular, we apply our approach to the evaluation of continuous combinatorial auctions, which represent a complex, sophisticated market mechanism that has not been generally available in the online marketplace but has the potential to enhance the economic efficiency of trade for assets with interdependent values. Such auctions are being increasingly used in industry, e.g., to procure logistical services. Intuitively, acceptance and usage of a complex mechanism can be fostered by a design that provides information and tools that meet the users' task demands. Based on prior research and an analysis of the auction tasks, we discuss practical and innovative information feedback schemes for reducing the cognitive burden of formulating bids in combinatorial auctions. Then, we use constructs from the technology acceptance model (TAM) - which have been consistently shown to be key determinants of technology acceptance in the extant literature - to compare the acceptability of the mechanism under three different information regimes. In addition, we borrow constructs from marketing theory to assess the potential growth in adoption of the mechanism. We compare user perceptions of the three alternative designs in a laboratory experiment with over 130 subjects. Our study constitutes a complementary and novel approach in evaluating the design of complex economic mechanisms. Results indicate a higher adoption and usage potential of the mechanism with advanced information feedback, supporting the potential of combinatorial auctions as a user-acceptable market mechanism with appropriate feedback.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)489-503
Number of pages15
JournalJournal of Operations Management
Volume31
Issue number6
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2013

Fingerprint

Feedback
Economics
Marketing
Market mechanism
Electronic markets
User acceptance
Industry
Experiments
Combinatorial auctions
Auctions
Acceptability

Keywords

  • Combinatorial auctions
  • Information feedback
  • Mechanism design
  • Technology acceptance
  • User perceptions

Cite this

User acceptance of complex electronic market mechanisms : Role of information feedback. / Adomavicius, Gediminas; Curley, Shawn P; Gupta, Alok; Sanyal, Pallab.

In: Journal of Operations Management, Vol. 31, No. 6, 01.01.2013, p. 489-503.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{e84361d3bfaa48279b2a340ccdbd93ee,
title = "User acceptance of complex electronic market mechanisms: Role of information feedback",
abstract = "This paper broadens the scope of evaluating the design of economic mechanisms that is traditionally done solely from an economic perspective. We introduce and demonstrate the application of acceptability to evaluate complex economic mechanisms. In particular, we apply our approach to the evaluation of continuous combinatorial auctions, which represent a complex, sophisticated market mechanism that has not been generally available in the online marketplace but has the potential to enhance the economic efficiency of trade for assets with interdependent values. Such auctions are being increasingly used in industry, e.g., to procure logistical services. Intuitively, acceptance and usage of a complex mechanism can be fostered by a design that provides information and tools that meet the users' task demands. Based on prior research and an analysis of the auction tasks, we discuss practical and innovative information feedback schemes for reducing the cognitive burden of formulating bids in combinatorial auctions. Then, we use constructs from the technology acceptance model (TAM) - which have been consistently shown to be key determinants of technology acceptance in the extant literature - to compare the acceptability of the mechanism under three different information regimes. In addition, we borrow constructs from marketing theory to assess the potential growth in adoption of the mechanism. We compare user perceptions of the three alternative designs in a laboratory experiment with over 130 subjects. Our study constitutes a complementary and novel approach in evaluating the design of complex economic mechanisms. Results indicate a higher adoption and usage potential of the mechanism with advanced information feedback, supporting the potential of combinatorial auctions as a user-acceptable market mechanism with appropriate feedback.",
keywords = "Combinatorial auctions, Information feedback, Mechanism design, Technology acceptance, User perceptions",
author = "Gediminas Adomavicius and Curley, {Shawn P} and Alok Gupta and Pallab Sanyal",
year = "2013",
month = "1",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.jom.2013.07.015",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "31",
pages = "489--503",
journal = "Journal of Operations Management",
issn = "0272-6963",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "6",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - User acceptance of complex electronic market mechanisms

T2 - Role of information feedback

AU - Adomavicius, Gediminas

AU - Curley, Shawn P

AU - Gupta, Alok

AU - Sanyal, Pallab

PY - 2013/1/1

Y1 - 2013/1/1

N2 - This paper broadens the scope of evaluating the design of economic mechanisms that is traditionally done solely from an economic perspective. We introduce and demonstrate the application of acceptability to evaluate complex economic mechanisms. In particular, we apply our approach to the evaluation of continuous combinatorial auctions, which represent a complex, sophisticated market mechanism that has not been generally available in the online marketplace but has the potential to enhance the economic efficiency of trade for assets with interdependent values. Such auctions are being increasingly used in industry, e.g., to procure logistical services. Intuitively, acceptance and usage of a complex mechanism can be fostered by a design that provides information and tools that meet the users' task demands. Based on prior research and an analysis of the auction tasks, we discuss practical and innovative information feedback schemes for reducing the cognitive burden of formulating bids in combinatorial auctions. Then, we use constructs from the technology acceptance model (TAM) - which have been consistently shown to be key determinants of technology acceptance in the extant literature - to compare the acceptability of the mechanism under three different information regimes. In addition, we borrow constructs from marketing theory to assess the potential growth in adoption of the mechanism. We compare user perceptions of the three alternative designs in a laboratory experiment with over 130 subjects. Our study constitutes a complementary and novel approach in evaluating the design of complex economic mechanisms. Results indicate a higher adoption and usage potential of the mechanism with advanced information feedback, supporting the potential of combinatorial auctions as a user-acceptable market mechanism with appropriate feedback.

AB - This paper broadens the scope of evaluating the design of economic mechanisms that is traditionally done solely from an economic perspective. We introduce and demonstrate the application of acceptability to evaluate complex economic mechanisms. In particular, we apply our approach to the evaluation of continuous combinatorial auctions, which represent a complex, sophisticated market mechanism that has not been generally available in the online marketplace but has the potential to enhance the economic efficiency of trade for assets with interdependent values. Such auctions are being increasingly used in industry, e.g., to procure logistical services. Intuitively, acceptance and usage of a complex mechanism can be fostered by a design that provides information and tools that meet the users' task demands. Based on prior research and an analysis of the auction tasks, we discuss practical and innovative information feedback schemes for reducing the cognitive burden of formulating bids in combinatorial auctions. Then, we use constructs from the technology acceptance model (TAM) - which have been consistently shown to be key determinants of technology acceptance in the extant literature - to compare the acceptability of the mechanism under three different information regimes. In addition, we borrow constructs from marketing theory to assess the potential growth in adoption of the mechanism. We compare user perceptions of the three alternative designs in a laboratory experiment with over 130 subjects. Our study constitutes a complementary and novel approach in evaluating the design of complex economic mechanisms. Results indicate a higher adoption and usage potential of the mechanism with advanced information feedback, supporting the potential of combinatorial auctions as a user-acceptable market mechanism with appropriate feedback.

KW - Combinatorial auctions

KW - Information feedback

KW - Mechanism design

KW - Technology acceptance

KW - User perceptions

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84885959704&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84885959704&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.jom.2013.07.015

DO - 10.1016/j.jom.2013.07.015

M3 - Article

VL - 31

SP - 489

EP - 503

JO - Journal of Operations Management

JF - Journal of Operations Management

SN - 0272-6963

IS - 6

ER -