Two dimensions of regulatory competition

Francesco Parisi, Norbert Schulz, Jonathan Klick

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

23 Scopus citations


This paper recasts current theories of regulatory or legislative competition. Building on the recent contribution of Buchanan and Yoon (2000) [Buchanan, J., & Yoon, R. Symmetric tragedies: Commons and anticommons. The Journal of Law and Economics, 43(1), 1-14], we consider alternative ways in which decision-making competence can be allocated among multiple legislative or administrative bodies. The general model is used to consider the equilibria obtained under different allocations of competence and to formulate some policy considerations.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)56-66
Number of pages11
JournalInternational Review of Law and Economics
Issue number1
StatePublished - Mar 2006


  • Commons
  • Duopoly
  • Legislatures
  • Regulation


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