Trading off efficiency and reciprocity in wireless peer-to-peer file sharing

Fernando Paganini, Martin Zubeldia, Andres Ferragut

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper considers the problem of allocating exchange rates in peer-to-peer dissemination, which must consider the dual objectives of throughput efficiency and reciprocity between peers, the latter essential to cooperation incentives. This question has been studied in prior research for wired networks under an upload constraint, where the focus is on achieving reciprocity through decentralized peer interactions. We consider here a wireless network substrate, for which link capacities are non-uniform according to the peering choice, and exchanges may be subject to interference. A convex optimization problem is formulated that trades off efficiency and reciprocity, and various schemes are investigated to achieve a decentralized solution.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2015 13th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2015
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages379-386
Number of pages8
ISBN (Electronic)9783901882746
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 6 2015
Externally publishedYes
Event2015 13th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2015 - Mumbai, India
Duration: May 25 2015May 29 2015

Publication series

Name2015 13th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2015

Conference

Conference2015 13th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2015
Country/TerritoryIndia
CityMumbai
Period5/25/155/29/15

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 IFIP.

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