TY - GEN
T1 - Towards complete node enumeration in a peer-to-peer botnet
AU - Kang, Brent Byunghoon
AU - Chan-Tin, Eric
AU - Lee, Christopher P.
AU - Tyra, James
AU - Kang, Hun Jeong
AU - Nunnery, Chris
AU - Wadler, Zachariah
AU - Sinclair, Greg
AU - Hopper, Nick
AU - Dagon, David
AU - Kim, Yongdae
PY - 2009
Y1 - 2009
N2 - Modern advanced botnets may employ a decentralized peer-to-peer overlay network to bootstrap and maintain their command and control channels, making them more resilient to traditional mitigation efforts such as server incapacitation. As an alternative strategy, the malware defense community has been trying to identify the bot-infected hosts and enumerate the IP addresses of the participating nodes so that the list can be used by system administrators to identify local infections, block spam emails sent from bots, and configure firewalls to protect local users. Enumerating the infected hosts, however, has presented challenges. One cannot identify infected hosts behind firewalls or NAT devices by employing crawlers, a commonly used enumeration technique where recursive get-peerlist lookup requests are sent newly discovered IP addresses of infected hosts. As many bot-infected machines in homes or offices are behind firewall or NAT devices, these crawler-based enumeration methods would miss a large portions of botnet infections. In this paper, we present the Passive P2P Monitor (PPM), which can enumerate the infected hosts regardless whether or not they are behind a firewall or NAT. As an empirical study, we examined the Storm botnet and enumerated its infected hosts using the PPM. We also improve our PPM design by incorporating a FireWall Checker (FWC) to identify nodes behind a firewall. Our experiment with the peer-to-peer Storm botnet shows that more than 40% of bots that contact the PPM are behind firewall or NAT devices, implying that crawler-based enumeration techniques would miss out a significant portion of the botnet population. Finally, we show that the PPM's coverage is based on a probability-based coverage model that we derived from the empirical observation of the Storm botnet.
AB - Modern advanced botnets may employ a decentralized peer-to-peer overlay network to bootstrap and maintain their command and control channels, making them more resilient to traditional mitigation efforts such as server incapacitation. As an alternative strategy, the malware defense community has been trying to identify the bot-infected hosts and enumerate the IP addresses of the participating nodes so that the list can be used by system administrators to identify local infections, block spam emails sent from bots, and configure firewalls to protect local users. Enumerating the infected hosts, however, has presented challenges. One cannot identify infected hosts behind firewalls or NAT devices by employing crawlers, a commonly used enumeration technique where recursive get-peerlist lookup requests are sent newly discovered IP addresses of infected hosts. As many bot-infected machines in homes or offices are behind firewall or NAT devices, these crawler-based enumeration methods would miss a large portions of botnet infections. In this paper, we present the Passive P2P Monitor (PPM), which can enumerate the infected hosts regardless whether or not they are behind a firewall or NAT. As an empirical study, we examined the Storm botnet and enumerated its infected hosts using the PPM. We also improve our PPM design by incorporating a FireWall Checker (FWC) to identify nodes behind a firewall. Our experiment with the peer-to-peer Storm botnet shows that more than 40% of bots that contact the PPM are behind firewall or NAT devices, implying that crawler-based enumeration techniques would miss out a significant portion of the botnet population. Finally, we show that the PPM's coverage is based on a probability-based coverage model that we derived from the empirical observation of the Storm botnet.
KW - Botnet
KW - Infected hosts enumeration
KW - P2P
KW - Storm
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=77952351261&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=77952351261&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/1533057.1533064
DO - 10.1145/1533057.1533064
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:77952351261
SN - 9781605583945
T3 - Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security, ASIACCS'09
SP - 23
EP - 34
BT - Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security, ASIACCS'09
T2 - 4th International Symposium on ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security, ASIACCS'09
Y2 - 10 March 2009 through 12 March 2009
ER -