Thought and qualia

David J Cole

doi:10.1007/BF00974195

Thought and qualia

David J Cole

Philosophy (Duluth)

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

I present a theory of the nature and basis of the conscious experience characteristic of occurent propositional attitudes: thinking this or that. As a preliminary I offer an extended criticism of Paul Schweizer's treatment of such consciousness as unexplained secondary qualities of neural events. I also attempt to rebut arguments against the possibility of functionalist accounts of conscious experience and qualia.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	283-302
Number of pages	20
Journal	Minds and Machines
Volume	4
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00974195
State	Published - Aug 1 1994

Keywords

Consciousness
functionalism
intentionality
physicalism
propositional attitudes
qualia
secondary properties

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10.1007/BF00974195

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KW - physicalism

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KW - secondary properties

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Thought and qualia

Abstract

Keywords

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