The theory of optimal delegation with an application to tariff caps

Manuel Amador; Kyle Bagwell

doi:10.3982/ECTA9288

The theory of optimal delegation with an application to tariff caps

Manuel Amador, Kyle Bagwell

Economics (Twin Cities)

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

107 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider a general representation of the delegation problem, with and without money burning, and provide sufficient and necessary conditions under which an interval allocation is optimal. We also apply our results to the theory of trade agreements among privately informed governments. For both perfect and monopolistic competition settings, we provide conditions under which tariff caps are optimal.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	1541-1599
Number of pages	59
Journal	Econometrica
Volume	81
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA9288
State	Published - Jul 2013

Keywords

Money burning
Optimal delegation
Tariff caps
Trade agreements

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

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10.3982/ECTA9288

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The theory of optimal delegation with an application to tariff caps

Abstract

Keywords

UN SDGs

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