Abstract
The stopping rule for a sequential experiment is the rule or procedure for determining when that experiment should end. Accordingly, the stopping rule principle (SRP) states that the evidential relationship between the final data from a sequential experiment and a hypothesis under consideration does not depend on the stopping rule: the same data should yield the same evidence, regardless of which stopping rule was used. I clarify and provide a novel defense of two interpretations of the main argument against the SRP, the foregone conclusion argument. According to the first, the SRP allows for highly confirmationally unreliable experiments, which concept I make precise, to confirm highly. According to the second, it entails the evidential equivalence of experiments differing significantly in their confirmational reliability. I rebut several attempts to deflate or deflect the foregone conclusion argument, drawing connections with replication in science and the likelihood principle.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 1-28 |
Number of pages | 28 |
Journal | Journal for General Philosophy of Science |
Volume | 55 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Mar 2024 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2023.
Keywords
- Confirmation
- Likelihood principle
- Reliability
- Replication
- Reproducability
- Statistical evidence
- Stopping rules