Abstract
It is often claimed that the phenomenal character of visual experience is 'transparent' in that the phenomenal features of visual experience do not seem 'mental'. It is then claimed that this transparency speaks in favour of some theories of experience while speaking against others. In this paper, I advance both a negative and a positive thesis about transparency. My negative thesis is that visual phenomenal character is reticent in that it does not reveal whether it is mental or non-mental in nature. This, in turn, means that, by itself, transparency does not speak in favour of (and against) the theories it is often thought to speak in favour of (and against). My positive thesis is that the phenomenon referred to as the 'transparency' of visual phenomenal character is best characterized in spatial, not mental, terms.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 393-414 |
| Number of pages | 22 |
| Journal | Australasian Journal of Philosophy |
| Volume | 85 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Dec 1 2007 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Fingerprint
Cite this
The reticence of visual phenomenal character : A spatial interpretation of transparency. / Schroer, Robert W.
In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 85, No. 3, 01.12.2007, p. 393-414.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - The reticence of visual phenomenal character
T2 - A spatial interpretation of transparency
AU - Schroer, Robert W
PY - 2007/12/1
Y1 - 2007/12/1
N2 - It is often claimed that the phenomenal character of visual experience is 'transparent' in that the phenomenal features of visual experience do not seem 'mental'. It is then claimed that this transparency speaks in favour of some theories of experience while speaking against others. In this paper, I advance both a negative and a positive thesis about transparency. My negative thesis is that visual phenomenal character is reticent in that it does not reveal whether it is mental or non-mental in nature. This, in turn, means that, by itself, transparency does not speak in favour of (and against) the theories it is often thought to speak in favour of (and against). My positive thesis is that the phenomenon referred to as the 'transparency' of visual phenomenal character is best characterized in spatial, not mental, terms.
AB - It is often claimed that the phenomenal character of visual experience is 'transparent' in that the phenomenal features of visual experience do not seem 'mental'. It is then claimed that this transparency speaks in favour of some theories of experience while speaking against others. In this paper, I advance both a negative and a positive thesis about transparency. My negative thesis is that visual phenomenal character is reticent in that it does not reveal whether it is mental or non-mental in nature. This, in turn, means that, by itself, transparency does not speak in favour of (and against) the theories it is often thought to speak in favour of (and against). My positive thesis is that the phenomenon referred to as the 'transparency' of visual phenomenal character is best characterized in spatial, not mental, terms.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=61149662253&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=61149662253&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/00048400701571644
DO - 10.1080/00048400701571644
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:61149662253
VL - 85
SP - 393
EP - 414
JO - Australasian Journal of Philosophy
JF - Australasian Journal of Philosophy
SN - 0004-8402
IS - 3
ER -