The principle of the common cause faces the Bernstein Paradox

Jos Uffink

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

25 Scopus citations

Abstract

I consider the problem of extending Reichenbach's principle of the common cause to more than two events, vis-à-vis an example posed by Bernstein. It is argued that the only reasonable extension of Reichenbach's principle stands in conflict with a recent proposal due to Horwich. I also discuss prospects of the principle of the common cause in the light of these and other difficulties known in the literature and argue that a more viable version of the principle is the one provided by Penrose and Percival (1962).

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)512-525
JournalPhilosophy of Science
Volume66
Issue number3 SUPPL. 1
DOIs
StatePublished - 1999

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'The principle of the common cause faces the Bernstein Paradox'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this