The optimal admission threshold in observable queues with state dependent pricing

Christian Borgs, Jennifer T. Chayes, Sherwin Doroudi, Mor Harchol-Balter, Kuang Xu

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

16 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider the social welfare model of Naor [20] and revenue-maximization model of Chen and Frank [7], where a single class of delay-sensitive customers seek service from a server with an observable queue, under state dependent pricing. It is known that in this setting both revenue and social welfare can be maximized by a threshold policy, whereby customers are barred from entry once the queue length reaches a certain threshold. However, no explicit expression for this threshold has been found. This paper presents the first derivation of the optimal threshold in closed form, and a surprisingly simple formula for the (maximum) revenue under this optimal threshold. Utilizing properties of the Lambert W function, we also provide explicit scaling results of the optimal threshold as the customer valuation grows. Finally, we present a generalization of our results, allowing for settings with multiple servers.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)101-119
Number of pages19
JournalProbability in the Engineering and Informational Sciences
Volume28
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2014

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© Cambridge University Press 2013.

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