The (Non)-existence of stable mechanisms in incomplete information environments

Nick Arnosti, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We consider two-sided matching markets, and study the incentives of agents to circumvent a centralized clearing house by signing binding contracts with one another. It is well-known that if the clearing house implements a stable match and preferences are known, then no group of agents can profitably deviate in this manner. We ask whether this property holds even when agents have incomplete information about their own preferences or the preferences of others. We find that it does not. In particular, when agents are uncertain about the preferences of others, every mechanism is susceptible to deviations by groups of agents. When, in addition, agents are uncertain about their own preferences, every mechanism is susceptible to deviations in which a single pair of agents agrees in advance to match to each other.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationWeb and Internet Economics - 11th International Conference, WINE 2015, Proceedings
EditorsGuido Schäfer, Evangelos Markakis
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages46-59
Number of pages14
ISBN (Print)9783662489949
DOIs
StatePublished - 2015
Externally publishedYes
Event11th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2015 - Amsterdam, Netherlands
Duration: Dec 9 2015Dec 12 2015

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume9470
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Other

Other11th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2015
Country/TerritoryNetherlands
CityAmsterdam
Period12/9/1512/12/15

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015.

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