We consider two-sided matching markets, and study the incentives of agents to circumvent a centralized clearing house by signing binding contracts with one another. It is well-known that if the clearing house implements a stable match and preferences are known, then no group of agents can profitably deviate in this manner. We ask whether this property holds even when agents have incomplete information about their own preferences or the preferences of others. We find that it does not. In particular, when agents are uncertain about the preferences of others, every mechanism is susceptible to deviations by groups of agents. When, in addition, agents are uncertain about their own preferences, every mechanism is susceptible to deviations in which a single pair of agents agrees in advance to match to each other.
|Original language||English (US)|
|Title of host publication||Web and Internet Economics - 11th International Conference, WINE 2015, Proceedings|
|Editors||Guido Schäfer, Evangelos Markakis|
|Number of pages||14|
|State||Published - 2015|
|Event||11th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2015 - Amsterdam, Netherlands|
Duration: Dec 9 2015 → Dec 12 2015
|Name||Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)|
|Other||11th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2015|
|Period||12/9/15 → 12/12/15|
Bibliographical notePublisher Copyright:
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015.