The goldilocks problem of the specificity of visual phenomenal content

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Existentialist accounts maintain that visual phenomenal content takes the logical form of an existentially quantified sentence. These accounts do not make phenomenal content specific enough. Singularist accounts posit a singular content in which the seen object is a constituent. These accounts make phenomenal content too specific. My account gets the specificity of visual phenomenal content just right. My account begins with John Searle's suggestion that visual experience represents an object as seen, moves this relation outside the scope of the existential quantifier and then replaces it with the relation of objects being present as accessible, as described by Alva Noë.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)476-495
Number of pages20
JournalCanadian Journal of Philosophy
StatePublished - Jul 4 2014

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2014 Canadian Journal of Philosophy.


  • existentially quantified content
  • perceptual content
  • phenomenal content
  • singular content
  • veridical illusion


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