The Economics of Split-Ticket Voting in Representative Democracies

V. V. Chari, Larry E. Jones, Ramon Marimon

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

80 Scopus citations

Abstract

In U.S. elections, voters often vote for candidates from different parties for president and Congress. Voters also express dissatisfaction with the performance of Congress as a whole and satisfaction with their own representative. We develop a model of split-ticket voting in which government spending is financed by uniform taxes. The benefits from this spending are concentrated. While the model generates split-ticket voting, overall spending is too high only if the president's powers are limited. Overall spending is too high in a parliamentary system. Our model can be used as the basis of an argument for term limits.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)957-976
Number of pages20
JournalAmerican Economic Review
Volume87
Issue number5
StatePublished - Dec 1 1997

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