The cost of the game: A taxonom Atly of social interactions

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

8 Scopus citations


This paper considers the role of reciprocity rules in various strategic settings. After distinguishing four typical categories of social interaction, the paper examines three forms of reciprocity constraints. An ideal rule of perfect incentive alignment ("structural reciprocity") serves as a benchmark for the analysis of a "golden rule" of reciprocity, characterized by a mechanical linking of one player's strategy to that of the other player; and a "silver rule" of stochastic reciprocity, characterized by a probabilistic symmetry in the relationship between the players.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)99-114
Number of pages16
JournalEuropean Journal of Law and Economics
Issue number2
StatePublished - 2000


  • Customary law
  • Game theory
  • Reciprocity
  • Social norms


Dive into the research topics of 'The cost of the game: A taxonom Atly of social interactions'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this