The conservation reserve program as a least-cost land retirement mechanism

Rodney B.W. Smith

The conservation reserve program as a least-cost land retirement mechanism

Rodney B.W. Smith

Applied Economics

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter

Abstract

Mechanism design theory is used to characterize the properties of a least-cost CRP. If marginal land rents decrease with acres farmed then a least-cost CRP is a set of nonlinear price schedules. If marginal land rents are independent of acres farmed then an offer system constitutes a least-cost CRP. The least-cost offer system gives a useful estimate of the upper bound of a least-cost CRP. Empirical results suggest that a 34-million-acre CRP should have cost no more than $1 billion per year.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	The Economics of Agri-Environmental Policy
Publisher	Taylor and Francis
Pages	257-269
Number of pages	13
Volume	2
ISBN (Electronic)	9781351146968
ISBN (Print)	9780815397694
State	Published - Nov 30 2017

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

SDG 15 Life on Land

Keywords

Asymmetric information
Contract
Mechanism design
Private information

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KW - Contract

KW - Mechanism design

KW - Private information

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M3 - Chapter

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BT - The Economics of Agri-Environmental Policy

PB - Taylor and Francis

ER -

The conservation reserve program as a least-cost land retirement mechanism

Abstract

UN SDGs

Keywords

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