Strategic preemption in a common property resource: A continuous time approach

Charles F. Mason, Stephen Polasky

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

The threat of future entry affects the exploitation of common property resources in important ways. An incumbent has a strategic incentive to manipulate the resource stock to deter entry or to harvest more stock prior to entry rather than share the resource with the entrant. It is possible that the threat of potential entry can lead to the extinction of the resource even though actual competition would result in a steady state with a positive stock level.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)255-278
Number of pages24
JournalEnvironmental and Resource Economics
Volume23
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 1 2002

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