States as Stakeholders: Federalism, Policy Feedback, and Government Elites

Andrew J Karch, Shanna Rose

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Politicians and program administrators played a central role in early studies of policy feedback but have largely been superseded by a focus on mass publics. This article attempts to revive and reorient the study of elite feedback effects by investigating, in the context of American federalism, whether and how national programs can influence the incentives and resources of state government officials. It examines four case studies in which national officials adopted a new program and subsequently tried to alter it by diminishing the states' administrative role, reducing the financial resources available, or terminating the program. State-level actors emerged as critical stakeholders and strongly resisted national efforts to reform unemployment insurance and Medicaid, but neither the Sheppard-Towner Act nor general revenue sharing generated strong elite-level feedback effects. This variation suggests that timing (i.e., the political, economic, and administrative context), policy design (financial generosity, administrative discretion, duration of authorization, and coalition potential), and their interaction can prompt or discourage government elites to mobilize.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)47-67
Number of pages21
JournalStudies in American Political Development
Volume31
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1 2017

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federalism
elite
stakeholder
unemployment insurance
authorization
resources
politician
coalition
revenue
incentive
act
reform
Government
Elites
Federalism
Stakeholders
interaction
economics
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Cite this

States as Stakeholders : Federalism, Policy Feedback, and Government Elites. / Karch, Andrew J; Rose, Shanna.

In: Studies in American Political Development, Vol. 31, No. 1, 01.04.2017, p. 47-67.

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

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