Abstract
In this paper I argue that the poker analogy is unsuitable as a model for collective bargaining negotiations. Using the poker game analogy is imprudent, its use undermines trust and ignores the cooperative features of business, and its use fails to take into account the values of dignity and fairness which should characterize labor-management negotiations. I propose and defend a model of ideal family decision-making as a superior model to the poker game.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 283-291 |
| Number of pages | 9 |
| Journal | Journal of Business Ethics |
| Volume | 4 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Aug 1 1985 |
UN SDGs
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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SDG 8 Decent Work and Economic Growth
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