Self-defeating subsidiarity

Emanuela Carbonara, Barbara Luppi, Francesco Parisi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

The subsidiarity principle was formally adopted in 1992 by the European Union to limit excessive centralization of competences. According to the subsidiarity test, a given policy responsibility should be allocated to the lowest possible level of government, unless there is evidence that the central government (the Union) has a comparative advantage in fulfilling the task under consideration. Contrary to its stated goal, the adoption of the subsidiarity principle was followed by a wave of intense centralization. In this paper, we address this paradox by studying the effects and the limitations of the subsidiarity test in promoting an optimal level of centralization.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number31
JournalReview of Law and Economics
Volume5
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2009

Bibliographical note

Copyright:
Copyright 2012 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

Keywords

  • Centralization
  • Comparative Advantage
  • Devolution
  • Economies of Scope
  • Popitz's Law
  • Subsidiarity

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