Scientific deduction--evidence is not necessarily informative: A reply to Wells and Harvey

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Abstract

G. L. Wells and J. H. Harvey (1977) have questioned the cogency of R. E. Nisbett and E. Borgida's (see record 1976-04569-001) argument that people ignore consensus information when making predictions and attributions. It is argued that Wells and Harvey have misinterpreted the meaning of D. Kahneman and A. Tversky's (see record 1976-02325-001) work on the psychology of prediction. It is also argued that Wells and Harvey's own data actually show a dramatic underutilization of consensus information in prediction and much less than optimal utilization for attribution. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved).

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)477-482
Number of pages6
JournalJournal of personality and social psychology
Volume36
Issue number5
DOIs
StatePublished - May 1978

Keywords

  • J. H. Harvey's criticism
  • attributions, reply to G. L. Wells &
  • underutilization of consensus information in making predictions &

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