Rumination and Wronging: The Role of Attention in Epistemic Morality

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Abstract

The idea that our epistemic practices can be wrongful has been the core observation driving the growing literature on epistemic injustice, doxastic wronging, and moral encroachment. But, one element of our epistemic practice has been starkly absent from this discussion of epistemic morality: Attention. The goal of this article is to show that attention is a worthwhile focus for epistemology, especially for the field of epistemic morality. After presenting a new dilemma for proponents of doxastic wronging, I show how focusing on attention not only allows us to defuse that dilemma, but also helps to substantiate accounts of what goes wrong in cases of doxastic wronging.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)491-514
Number of pages24
JournalEpisteme
Volume19
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 21 2022

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press.

Keywords

  • Attention
  • attentional epistemic wronging
  • doxastic wronging
  • epistemic morality
  • ethics of belief
  • ethics of thought

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