TY - JOUR
T1 - Risky decisions are influenced by individual attributes as a function of risk preference
AU - Lee, Douglas G.
AU - D'Alessandro, Marco
AU - Iodice, Pierpaolo
AU - Calluso, Cinzia
AU - Rustichini, Aldo
AU - Pezzulo, Giovanni
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 The Authors
PY - 2023/12
Y1 - 2023/12
N2 - It has long been assumed in economic theory that multi-attribute decisions involving several attributes or dimensions – such as probabilities and amounts of money to be earned during risky choices – are resolved by first combining the attributes of each option to form an overall expected value and then comparing the expected values of the alternative options, using a unique evidence accumulation process. A plausible alternative would be performing independent comparisons between the individual attributes and then integrating the results of the comparisons afterwards. Here, we devise a novel method to disambiguate between these types of models, by orthogonally manipulating the expected value of choice options and the relative salience of their attributes. Our results, based on behavioral measures and drift-diffusion models, provide evidence in favor of the framework where information about individual attributes independently impacts deliberation. This suggests that risky decisions are resolved by running in parallel multiple comparisons between the separate attributes – possibly alongside an additional comparison of expected value. This result stands in contrast with the assumption of standard economic theory that choices require a unique comparison of expected values and suggests that at the cognitive level, decision processes might be more distributed than commonly assumed. Beyond our planned analyses, we also discovered that attribute salience affects people of different risk preference type in different ways: risk-averse participants seem to focus more on probability, except when monetary amount is particularly high; risk-neutral/seeking participants, in contrast, seem to focus more on monetary amount, except when probability is particularly low.
AB - It has long been assumed in economic theory that multi-attribute decisions involving several attributes or dimensions – such as probabilities and amounts of money to be earned during risky choices – are resolved by first combining the attributes of each option to form an overall expected value and then comparing the expected values of the alternative options, using a unique evidence accumulation process. A plausible alternative would be performing independent comparisons between the individual attributes and then integrating the results of the comparisons afterwards. Here, we devise a novel method to disambiguate between these types of models, by orthogonally manipulating the expected value of choice options and the relative salience of their attributes. Our results, based on behavioral measures and drift-diffusion models, provide evidence in favor of the framework where information about individual attributes independently impacts deliberation. This suggests that risky decisions are resolved by running in parallel multiple comparisons between the separate attributes – possibly alongside an additional comparison of expected value. This result stands in contrast with the assumption of standard economic theory that choices require a unique comparison of expected values and suggests that at the cognitive level, decision processes might be more distributed than commonly assumed. Beyond our planned analyses, we also discovered that attribute salience affects people of different risk preference type in different ways: risk-averse participants seem to focus more on probability, except when monetary amount is particularly high; risk-neutral/seeking participants, in contrast, seem to focus more on monetary amount, except when probability is particularly low.
KW - Decision-making
KW - Drift-diffusion model
KW - Multi-attribute choice
KW - Risk aversion
KW - Risky choice
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U2 - 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2023.101614
DO - 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2023.101614
M3 - Article
C2 - 37837926
AN - SCOPUS:85173646748
SN - 0010-0285
VL - 147
JO - Cognitive Psychology
JF - Cognitive Psychology
M1 - 101614
ER -