Abstract
We discuss a solution to the winner determination problem which takes into account not only costs but also risk aversion of the agent that accepts the bids and works for tasks that have time and precedence constraints. We develop an equivalent unit approach to the group of tasks to analyze the system and use Expected Utility Theory as the basic mechanism for decision-making. Our theoretical and experimental analysis shows that Expected Utility is especially useful for choosing between cheap-but-risky and costly-but-safe bids. Moreover, we show how bids with similar costs and similar probabilities of being successfully completed but different time windows can be efficiently selected or rejected.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce |
| Editors | N. Sadeh |
| Pages | 150-157 |
| Number of pages | 8 |
| Volume | 5 |
| State | Published - 2003 |
| Event | Fifth International Conference on Electric Commerce, ICEC 2003 - Pittsburgh, PA, United States Duration: Sep 30 2003 → Oct 3 2003 |
Other
| Other | Fifth International Conference on Electric Commerce, ICEC 2003 |
|---|---|
| Country/Territory | United States |
| City | Pittsburgh, PA |
| Period | 9/30/03 → 10/3/03 |
Keywords
- Automated auctions
- Expected utility
- Multi-agent contracting
- Risk
- Winner determination