Resource packaging in keyword auctions

Jianqing Chen; De Liu; Andrew B. Whinston

Resource packaging in keyword auctions

Jianqing Chen, De Liu, Andrew B. Whinston

Information and Decision Sciences

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

Motivated by the enormous growth of keyword advertising, this paper studies how to package certain resources into shares for auctioning to maximize the auctioneer's expected revenue. We study such a problem in a unit-price auction setting where each bidder has private valuation for the shares, and the allocation of shares is determined by the rank-order of bidders' willingness-topay for per-unit resources. We investigate two facets of the resource packaging problem. First, when resources are homogeneous, we consider how to choose the number and sizes of shares (i.e., the share structure) to maximize the auctioneer's revenue. Second, when resources are heterogeneous, we analyze whether to offer them together (by blending the resources) or separately in different auctions.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	ICIS 2006 Proceedings - Twenty-Seventh International Conference on Information Systems
Pages	1999-2014
Number of pages	16
State	Published - Dec 1 2006
Event	27th International Conference on Information Systems, ICIS 2006 - Milwaukee, WI, United States Duration: Dec 10 2006 → Dec 13 2006

Other

Other	27th International Conference on Information Systems, ICIS 2006
Country/Territory	United States
City	Milwaukee, WI
Period	12/10/06 → 12/13/06

Keywords

Divisible goods
Keyword advertising
Search engine
Share structures
Unit-price auctions

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title = "Resource packaging in keyword auctions",

abstract = "Motivated by the enormous growth of keyword advertising, this paper studies how to package certain resources into shares for auctioning to maximize the auctioneer's expected revenue. We study such a problem in a unit-price auction setting where each bidder has private valuation for the shares, and the allocation of shares is determined by the rank-order of bidders' willingness-topay for per-unit resources. We investigate two facets of the resource packaging problem. First, when resources are homogeneous, we consider how to choose the number and sizes of shares (i.e., the share structure) to maximize the auctioneer's revenue. Second, when resources are heterogeneous, we analyze whether to offer them together (by blending the resources) or separately in different auctions.",

keywords = "Divisible goods, Keyword advertising, Search engine, Share structures, Unit-price auctions",

author = "Jianqing Chen and De Liu and Whinston, {Andrew B.}",

year = "2006",

month = dec,

day = "1",

language = "English (US)",

pages = "1999--2014",

booktitle = "ICIS 2006 Proceedings - Twenty-Seventh International Conference on Information Systems",

note = "27th International Conference on Information Systems, ICIS 2006 ; Conference date: 10-12-2006 Through 13-12-2006",

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TY - GEN

T1 - Resource packaging in keyword auctions

AU - Chen, Jianqing

AU - Liu, De

AU - Whinston, Andrew B.

PY - 2006/12/1

Y1 - 2006/12/1

N2 - Motivated by the enormous growth of keyword advertising, this paper studies how to package certain resources into shares for auctioning to maximize the auctioneer's expected revenue. We study such a problem in a unit-price auction setting where each bidder has private valuation for the shares, and the allocation of shares is determined by the rank-order of bidders' willingness-topay for per-unit resources. We investigate two facets of the resource packaging problem. First, when resources are homogeneous, we consider how to choose the number and sizes of shares (i.e., the share structure) to maximize the auctioneer's revenue. Second, when resources are heterogeneous, we analyze whether to offer them together (by blending the resources) or separately in different auctions.

AB - Motivated by the enormous growth of keyword advertising, this paper studies how to package certain resources into shares for auctioning to maximize the auctioneer's expected revenue. We study such a problem in a unit-price auction setting where each bidder has private valuation for the shares, and the allocation of shares is determined by the rank-order of bidders' willingness-topay for per-unit resources. We investigate two facets of the resource packaging problem. First, when resources are homogeneous, we consider how to choose the number and sizes of shares (i.e., the share structure) to maximize the auctioneer's revenue. Second, when resources are heterogeneous, we analyze whether to offer them together (by blending the resources) or separately in different auctions.

KW - Divisible goods

KW - Keyword advertising

KW - Search engine

KW - Share structures

KW - Unit-price auctions

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84870169770&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84870169770&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:84870169770

SP - 1999

EP - 2014

BT - ICIS 2006 Proceedings - Twenty-Seventh International Conference on Information Systems

T2 - 27th International Conference on Information Systems, ICIS 2006

Y2 - 10 December 2006 through 13 December 2006

ER -

Resource packaging in keyword auctions

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