Resource packaging in keyword auctions

Jianqing Chen, De Liu, Andrew B. Whinston

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

2 Scopus citations


Motivated by the enormous growth of keyword advertising, this paper studies how to package certain resources into shares for auctioning to maximize the auctioneer's expected revenue. We study such a problem in a unit-price auction setting where each bidder has private valuation for the shares, and the allocation of shares is determined by the rank-order of bidders' willingness-topay for per-unit resources. We investigate two facets of the resource packaging problem. First, when resources are homogeneous, we consider how to choose the number and sizes of shares (i.e., the share structure) to maximize the auctioneer's revenue. Second, when resources are heterogeneous, we analyze whether to offer them together (by blending the resources) or separately in different auctions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationICIS 2006 Proceedings - Twenty-Seventh International Conference on Information Systems
Number of pages16
StatePublished - Dec 1 2006
Event27th International Conference on Information Systems, ICIS 2006 - Milwaukee, WI, United States
Duration: Dec 10 2006Dec 13 2006


Other27th International Conference on Information Systems, ICIS 2006
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityMilwaukee, WI


  • Divisible goods
  • Keyword advertising
  • Search engine
  • Share structures
  • Unit-price auctions


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