Abstract
Both visual experience and conscious thought represent external objects, but in visual experience these objects seem present before the mind and available for direct access in a way that they don't in conscious thought. In this paper, I introduce a couple of challenges that this "Scene-Immediacy" of visual experience raises for traditional versions of Representationalism. I then identify a resource to which Representationalists can appeal in addressing these challenges: the low-detail fringe of visual experience. I argue that low-detail contents within visual experience provide the mind with a rich access to additional high-detail information, an access that is not found in conscious thought. This access, in turn, speaks to the challenges raised by the Scene-Immediacy of visual experience. Robert Schroer is an Assistant Professor at the University of Minnesota at Duluth.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 595-615 |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| Journal | Philosophical Psychology |
| Volume | 25 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Aug 2012 |
Keywords
- Consciousness
- Perceptual Presence
- Representationalism
- Scene-Immediacy
- The Fringe of Consciousness
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