Rent seeking, protectionism and innovation in the American steel industry

Stefanie Lenway, Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

48 Scopus citations

Abstract

Trade protection in a declining industry can cause damages beyond those revealed in the usual trade diagram analysis. Using data on the US steel firms, we show that trade protection in that industry rewards poor performance, reduces incentives to innovate, and frustrates the normal Schumpeterian process of creative destruction.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)410-421
Number of pages12
JournalEconomic Journal
Volume106
Issue number435
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1996

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Rent seeking, protectionism and innovation in the American steel industry'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this