Reciprocity, matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games

Rachel Croson, Enrique Fatas, Tibor Neugebauer

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

70 Scopus citations

Abstract

Experimental and empirical evidence identifies social preferences and proposes competing models of such preferences. We find that participants match the contributions of others in the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). We also examine a game with different equilibria, the weakest link mechanism (WLM). Here, in contrast, participants match the minimum contribution of others.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)95-101
Number of pages7
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume87
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1 2005
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
Croson acknowledges financial support from the National Science Foundation (SBR-9876079). Fatas acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Minister of Science and Technology (BEC2002-04380-C02-01 and SEJ2004-07554/ECON).

Keywords

  • Experimental economics
  • Public goods
  • Voluntary contribution mechanism
  • Weakest link mechanism

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