Reciprocity, matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games

Rachel Croson; Enrique Fatas; Tibor Neugebauer

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2004.10.007

Reciprocity, matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games

Rachel Croson, Enrique Fatas, Tibor Neugebauer

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92 Scopus citations

Abstract

Experimental and empirical evidence identifies social preferences and proposes competing models of such preferences. We find that participants match the contributions of others in the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). We also examine a game with different equilibria, the weakest link mechanism (WLM). Here, in contrast, participants match the minimum contribution of others.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	95-101
Number of pages	7
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	87
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.10.007
State	Published - Apr 1 2005
Externally published	Yes

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
Croson acknowledges financial support from the National Science Foundation (SBR-9876079). Fatas acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Minister of Science and Technology (BEC2002-04380-C02-01 and SEJ2004-07554/ECON).

Keywords

Experimental economics
Public goods
Voluntary contribution mechanism
Weakest link mechanism

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10.1016/j.econlet.2004.10.007

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title = "Reciprocity, matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games",

abstract = "Experimental and empirical evidence identifies social preferences and proposes competing models of such preferences. We find that participants match the contributions of others in the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). We also examine a game with different equilibria, the weakest link mechanism (WLM). Here, in contrast, participants match the minimum contribution of others.",

keywords = "Experimental economics, Public goods, Voluntary contribution mechanism, Weakest link mechanism",

author = "Rachel Croson and Enrique Fatas and Tibor Neugebauer",

note = "Funding Information: Croson acknowledges financial support from the National Science Foundation (SBR-9876079). Fatas acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Minister of Science and Technology (BEC2002-04380-C02-01 and SEJ2004-07554/ECON). ",

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AU - Croson, Rachel

AU - Fatas, Enrique

AU - Neugebauer, Tibor

N1 - Funding Information: Croson acknowledges financial support from the National Science Foundation (SBR-9876079). Fatas acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Minister of Science and Technology (BEC2002-04380-C02-01 and SEJ2004-07554/ECON).

PY - 2005/4/1

Y1 - 2005/4/1

N2 - Experimental and empirical evidence identifies social preferences and proposes competing models of such preferences. We find that participants match the contributions of others in the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). We also examine a game with different equilibria, the weakest link mechanism (WLM). Here, in contrast, participants match the minimum contribution of others.

AB - Experimental and empirical evidence identifies social preferences and proposes competing models of such preferences. We find that participants match the contributions of others in the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). We also examine a game with different equilibria, the weakest link mechanism (WLM). Here, in contrast, participants match the minimum contribution of others.

KW - Experimental economics

KW - Public goods

KW - Voluntary contribution mechanism

KW - Weakest link mechanism

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JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 1

ER -

Reciprocity, matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

Publisher link

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