Recall and private monitoring

Christopher Phelan, Andrzej Skrzypacz

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

For a general class of games with private monitoring we show for any finite state strategy (or automaton strategy) with Di states for players i∈{1,..., N}, if there exists a number of periods t such that it is possible on-path to reach any joint state from any joint state in t periods, the strategy is a strict correlated equilibrium only if each player's strategy is a function only of what the player observes in the last Di-1 periods.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)162-170
Number of pages9
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume90
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1 2015

    Fingerprint

Keywords

  • Private monitoring
  • Repeated games

Cite this