Recall and private monitoring

Christopher Phelan; Andrzej Skrzypacz

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.010

Recall and private monitoring

Christopher Phelan, Andrzej Skrzypacz

Economics (Twin Cities)

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

For a general class of games with private monitoring we show for any finite state strategy (or automaton strategy) with D_i states for players i∈{1,..., N}, if there exists a number of periods t such that it is possible on-path to reach any joint state from any joint state in t periods, the strategy is a strict correlated equilibrium only if each player's strategy is a function only of what the player observes in the last D_i-1 periods.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	162-170
Number of pages	9
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	90
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.010
State	Published - Mar 1 2015

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
The authors thank Jeff Ely, Johannes Hörner, Michihiro Kandori, George Mailath, Ichiro Obara, and Ofer Zeitouni for helpful conversations. Financial assistance from National Science Foundation Grant # 0721090 is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.

Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 Elsevier Inc.

Keywords

Private monitoring
Repeated games

Publisher link

10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.010

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title = "Recall and private monitoring",

abstract = "For a general class of games with private monitoring we show for any finite state strategy (or automaton strategy) with Di states for players i∈{1,..., N}, if there exists a number of periods t such that it is possible on-path to reach any joint state from any joint state in t periods, the strategy is a strict correlated equilibrium only if each player's strategy is a function only of what the player observes in the last Di-1 periods.",

keywords = "Private monitoring, Repeated games",

author = "Christopher Phelan and Andrzej Skrzypacz",

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doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.010",

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AU - Skrzypacz, Andrzej

N1 - Funding Information: The authors thank Jeff Ely, Johannes Hörner, Michihiro Kandori, George Mailath, Ichiro Obara, and Ofer Zeitouni for helpful conversations. Financial assistance from National Science Foundation Grant # 0721090 is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System. Publisher Copyright: © 2015 Elsevier Inc.

PY - 2015/3/1

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N2 - For a general class of games with private monitoring we show for any finite state strategy (or automaton strategy) with Di states for players i∈{1,..., N}, if there exists a number of periods t such that it is possible on-path to reach any joint state from any joint state in t periods, the strategy is a strict correlated equilibrium only if each player's strategy is a function only of what the player observes in the last Di-1 periods.

AB - For a general class of games with private monitoring we show for any finite state strategy (or automaton strategy) with Di states for players i∈{1,..., N}, if there exists a number of periods t such that it is possible on-path to reach any joint state from any joint state in t periods, the strategy is a strict correlated equilibrium only if each player's strategy is a function only of what the player observes in the last Di-1 periods.

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KW - Repeated games

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VL - 90

SP - 162

EP - 170

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

ER -

Recall and private monitoring

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

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