Recall and private monitoring

Christopher Phelan, Andrzej Skrzypacz

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


For a general class of games with private monitoring we show for any finite state strategy (or automaton strategy) with Di states for players i∈{1,..., N}, if there exists a number of periods t such that it is possible on-path to reach any joint state from any joint state in t periods, the strategy is a strict correlated equilibrium only if each player's strategy is a function only of what the player observes in the last Di-1 periods.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)162-170
Number of pages9
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
StatePublished - Mar 1 2015

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
The authors thank Jeff Ely, Johannes Hörner, Michihiro Kandori, George Mailath, Ichiro Obara, and Ofer Zeitouni for helpful conversations. Financial assistance from National Science Foundation Grant # 0721090 is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.

Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 Elsevier Inc.


  • Private monitoring
  • Repeated games


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