Provider Payment and Incentives

Jon B. Christianson, Douglas Conrad

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

The design of incentives and the evaluation of their impact are examined in the research literature at many different levels. This article provides a background and a conceptual framework relating to the effects of payment incentives on the behavior of health care providers. It then summarizes the empirical literature on the effect of financial incentives in health care. The article offers a conceptual model of the provider's choice of the quantity and quality of output as a means of organizing our thinking about the effects of specific provider payment incentives. This article addresses the effect of general provider payment incentives on the amount and type of care provided; the evidence that general payment incentives have indirectly affected quality of care; and the impact of payment incentive programs that attempt specifically to reward providers for improving quality of care, or for achieving specific benchmark levels of quality.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationThe Oxford Handbook of Health Economics
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Electronic)9780191743719
ISBN (Print)9780199238828
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 18 2012

Keywords

  • Conceptual model
  • Health care providers
  • Incentives
  • Payment
  • Quality

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