Abstract
Can pragmatism account for the private aspect of the self? The classical pragmatists - Peirce, James, Mead, and Dewey - mount various attacks on the Cartesian view of the self, and they offer varied and attractive positive accounts of the person. But does pragmatism adequately acknowledge privacy or personal "inwardness"? I explore here the pragmatic picture of the self, drawing on all the classical sources, and I assess the adequacy of pragmatic resources for describing and explaining the puzzles of personal privacy.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 28-45 |
| Number of pages | 18 |
| Journal | COGNITIO: Journal of Philosophy |
| Issue number | 2 |
| State | Published - 2001 |
Keywords
- Pragmatism
- Peirce
- Dewey
- James
- Mead
- Descartes
- Philosophy