Abstract
Given that pricing plays an important role in a company's international competitive strategy, researchers have long argued the need for theory building in the area of international pricing. This study develops an optimal pricing strategy for foreign market entry using a game theoretic framework. The proposed model assumes two firms, a local incumbent and a foreign entrant, competing in a market. Consumers know the quality of the incumbent's offering, but do not know how it compares to that of the foreign entrant's. Based on these assumptions, and using the theory of inference making, we propose an upward price distortion by the entrant firm as an optimal entry strategy under incomplete information. The paper presents a game theoretic derivation to establish that the game has a unique intuitive separating equilibrium where the entrant firm stands to gain by engaging in upward price distortion to signal high quality to consumers.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 643-653 |
Number of pages | 11 |
Journal | Managerial and Decision Economics |
Volume | 27 |
Issue number | 8 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Dec 2006 |