Open-Mindedness and Normative Contingency

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The value of open-mindedness as a virtue is most obviously explained by its truth conduciveness. Being open to opinions that conflict with one's own gives "the truth a chance of reaching us," as John Stuart Mill put it in On Liberty. For Mill, open-mindedness is a virtue of theoretical and practical reasoning alike. Mill's model assumes that in both cases the truths are "out there" to be discovered or to hit us in the head. We do better by being open-minded because a closed mind will not see what is out there (or will not notice when contradictory evidence hits it). But if (as many metaethicists think today) moral "truths" are not out there, what is the point of an open mind? What are we being open to? For those who think that normative judgments are contingent in some way on us, Mill's explanation of the value of open-mindedness seems unavailable. This chapter argues that such metaethical views can make sense of the value of open-mindedness by appeal to some important features of the practice of making normative judgments and the costs of abandoning this practice.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationOxford Studies in Metaethics
PublisherOxford University Press
Volume7
ISBN (Electronic)9780191741661
ISBN (Print)9780199653492
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 28 2012

Fingerprint

Contingency
Costs
Contradictory
John Stuart Mill
Liberty
Conduciveness
Contingent
Practical Reasoning

Keywords

  • Constructivism
  • Contingency
  • Moral epistemology
  • Normativity
  • Open-mindedness
  • Practical reasoning

Cite this

Tiberius, V. (2012). Open-Mindedness and Normative Contingency. In Oxford Studies in Metaethics (Vol. 7). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653492.003.0006

Open-Mindedness and Normative Contingency. / Tiberius, Valerie.

Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Vol. 7 Oxford University Press, 2012.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Tiberius, V 2012, Open-Mindedness and Normative Contingency. in Oxford Studies in Metaethics. vol. 7, Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653492.003.0006
Tiberius V. Open-Mindedness and Normative Contingency. In Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Vol. 7. Oxford University Press. 2012 https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653492.003.0006
Tiberius, Valerie. / Open-Mindedness and Normative Contingency. Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Vol. 7 Oxford University Press, 2012.
@inbook{ff1d0284bc8740ba803d27e9b420287e,
title = "Open-Mindedness and Normative Contingency",
abstract = "The value of open-mindedness as a virtue is most obviously explained by its truth conduciveness. Being open to opinions that conflict with one's own gives {"}the truth a chance of reaching us,{"} as John Stuart Mill put it in On Liberty. For Mill, open-mindedness is a virtue of theoretical and practical reasoning alike. Mill's model assumes that in both cases the truths are {"}out there{"} to be discovered or to hit us in the head. We do better by being open-minded because a closed mind will not see what is out there (or will not notice when contradictory evidence hits it). But if (as many metaethicists think today) moral {"}truths{"} are not out there, what is the point of an open mind? What are we being open to? For those who think that normative judgments are contingent in some way on us, Mill's explanation of the value of open-mindedness seems unavailable. This chapter argues that such metaethical views can make sense of the value of open-mindedness by appeal to some important features of the practice of making normative judgments and the costs of abandoning this practice.",
keywords = "Constructivism, Contingency, Moral epistemology, Normativity, Open-mindedness, Practical reasoning",
author = "Valerie Tiberius",
year = "2012",
month = "6",
day = "28",
doi = "10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653492.003.0006",
language = "English (US)",
isbn = "9780199653492",
volume = "7",
booktitle = "Oxford Studies in Metaethics",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
address = "United States",

}

TY - CHAP

T1 - Open-Mindedness and Normative Contingency

AU - Tiberius, Valerie

PY - 2012/6/28

Y1 - 2012/6/28

N2 - The value of open-mindedness as a virtue is most obviously explained by its truth conduciveness. Being open to opinions that conflict with one's own gives "the truth a chance of reaching us," as John Stuart Mill put it in On Liberty. For Mill, open-mindedness is a virtue of theoretical and practical reasoning alike. Mill's model assumes that in both cases the truths are "out there" to be discovered or to hit us in the head. We do better by being open-minded because a closed mind will not see what is out there (or will not notice when contradictory evidence hits it). But if (as many metaethicists think today) moral "truths" are not out there, what is the point of an open mind? What are we being open to? For those who think that normative judgments are contingent in some way on us, Mill's explanation of the value of open-mindedness seems unavailable. This chapter argues that such metaethical views can make sense of the value of open-mindedness by appeal to some important features of the practice of making normative judgments and the costs of abandoning this practice.

AB - The value of open-mindedness as a virtue is most obviously explained by its truth conduciveness. Being open to opinions that conflict with one's own gives "the truth a chance of reaching us," as John Stuart Mill put it in On Liberty. For Mill, open-mindedness is a virtue of theoretical and practical reasoning alike. Mill's model assumes that in both cases the truths are "out there" to be discovered or to hit us in the head. We do better by being open-minded because a closed mind will not see what is out there (or will not notice when contradictory evidence hits it). But if (as many metaethicists think today) moral "truths" are not out there, what is the point of an open mind? What are we being open to? For those who think that normative judgments are contingent in some way on us, Mill's explanation of the value of open-mindedness seems unavailable. This chapter argues that such metaethical views can make sense of the value of open-mindedness by appeal to some important features of the practice of making normative judgments and the costs of abandoning this practice.

KW - Constructivism

KW - Contingency

KW - Moral epistemology

KW - Normativity

KW - Open-mindedness

KW - Practical reasoning

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84921732581&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84921732581&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653492.003.0006

DO - 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653492.003.0006

M3 - Chapter

SN - 9780199653492

VL - 7

BT - Oxford Studies in Metaethics

PB - Oxford University Press

ER -