TY - JOUR
T1 - Online Prediction with History-Dependent Experts
T2 - The General Case
AU - Drenska, Nadejda
AU - Calder, Jeff
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 The Authors. Communications on Pure and Applied Mathematics published by Wiley Periodicals LLC.
PY - 2022
Y1 - 2022
N2 - We study the problem of prediction of binary sequences with expert advice in the online setting, which is a classic example of online machine learning. We interpret the binary sequence as the price history of a stock, and view the predictor as an investor, which converts the problem into a stock prediction problem. In this framework, an investor, who predicts the daily movements of a stock, and an adversarial market, who controls the stock, play against each other over N turns. The investor combines the predictions of (Formula presented.) experts in order to make a decision about how much to invest at each turn, and aims to minimize their regret with respect to the best-performing expert at the end of the game. We consider the problem with history-dependent experts, in which each expert uses the previous d days of history of the market in making their predictions. We prove that the value function for this game, rescaled appropriately, converges as (Formula presented.) at a rate of (Formula presented.) to the viscosity solution of a nonlinear degenerate elliptic PDE, which can be understood as the Hamilton-Jacobi-Issacs equation for the two-person game. As a result, we are able to deduce asymptotically optimal strategies for the investor. Our results extend those established by the first author and R.V. Kohn [14] for (Formula presented.) experts and (Formula presented.) days of history.
AB - We study the problem of prediction of binary sequences with expert advice in the online setting, which is a classic example of online machine learning. We interpret the binary sequence as the price history of a stock, and view the predictor as an investor, which converts the problem into a stock prediction problem. In this framework, an investor, who predicts the daily movements of a stock, and an adversarial market, who controls the stock, play against each other over N turns. The investor combines the predictions of (Formula presented.) experts in order to make a decision about how much to invest at each turn, and aims to minimize their regret with respect to the best-performing expert at the end of the game. We consider the problem with history-dependent experts, in which each expert uses the previous d days of history of the market in making their predictions. We prove that the value function for this game, rescaled appropriately, converges as (Formula presented.) at a rate of (Formula presented.) to the viscosity solution of a nonlinear degenerate elliptic PDE, which can be understood as the Hamilton-Jacobi-Issacs equation for the two-person game. As a result, we are able to deduce asymptotically optimal strategies for the investor. Our results extend those established by the first author and R.V. Kohn [14] for (Formula presented.) experts and (Formula presented.) days of history.
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U2 - 10.1002/cpa.22049
DO - 10.1002/cpa.22049
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85127375234
SN - 0010-3640
JO - Communications on Pure and Applied Mathematics
JF - Communications on Pure and Applied Mathematics
ER -