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Online incentive-compatible mechanisms for traffic intersection auctions
David Rey
,
Michael W. Levin
, Vinayak V. Dixit
Civil, Environmental, and Geo- Engineering
Research output
:
Contribution to journal
›
Article
›
peer-review
24
Scopus citations
Overview
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Keyphrases
Incentive Mechanism
100%
Traffic Intersection
100%
Online Incentives
100%
Online Mechanism
60%
Delay Cost
60%
Expected Waiting Time
40%
Social Welfare
20%
Numerical Experiments
20%
Declare
20%
Value of Time
20%
Under-report
20%
Markov Chain Model
20%
Queue-based
20%
Strategy-proofness
20%
Priority Service
20%
Lead User
20%
Extended State Space
20%
Arrival Probability
20%
Static Pricing
20%
Lane-based
20%
Pricing Approach
20%
Computer Science
State Space
100%
Priority Service
100%
markov chain model
100%
Decreasing Order
100%