@inproceedings{fcce4165379b47b7b788607e961a68a1,
title = "On the risks of serving whenever you surf: Vulnerabilities in Tor's blocking resistance design",
abstract = "In Tor, a bridge is a client node that volunteers to help censored users access Tor by serving as an unlisted, first-hop relay. Since bridging is voluntary, the success of this circumvention mechanism depends critically on the willingness of clients to act as bridges. We identify three key architectural shortcomings of the bridge design: (1) bridges are easy to find; (2) a bridge always accepts connections when its operator is using Tor; and (3) traffic to and from clients connected to a bridge interferes with traffic to and from the bridge operator. These shortcomings lead to an attack that can expose the IP address of bridge operators visiting certain web sites over Tor. We also discuss mitigation mechanisms.",
keywords = "Anonymous communication, Blocking resistance",
author = "Jon McLachlan and Nicholas Hopper",
year = "2009",
month = nov,
day = "9",
doi = "10.1145/1655188.1655193",
language = "English (US)",
isbn = "9781605587837",
series = "Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security",
publisher = "Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)",
pages = "31--40",
booktitle = "Proceedings of the 8th ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, WPES '09, Co-located with the 16th ACM Computer and Communications Security Conference, CCS'09",
address = "United States",
note = "8th ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, WPES 2009, Co-located with the 16th ACM Computer and Communications Security Conference, CCS 2009 ; Conference date: 09-11-2009 Through 09-11-2009",
}