On the irrelevance of the maturity structure of government debt without commitment

Christopher Phelan

doi:10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00053-8

On the irrelevance of the maturity structure of government debt without commitment

Christopher Phelan

Economics (Twin Cities)

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper presents a government debt game with the property that if the timing of debt auctions within a period is sufficiently unfettered, the set of equilibrium outcome paths of real economic variables given the government has access to a rich debt structure is identical to the set of equilibrium outcome paths given the government can issue only one-period debt.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	115-128
Number of pages	14
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	46
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00053-8
State	Published - Jan 2004

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abstract = "This paper presents a government debt game with the property that if the timing of debt auctions within a period is sufficiently unfettered, the set of equilibrium outcome paths of real economic variables given the government has access to a rich debt structure is identical to the set of equilibrium outcome paths given the government can issue only one-period debt.",

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AB - This paper presents a government debt game with the property that if the timing of debt auctions within a period is sufficiently unfettered, the set of equilibrium outcome paths of real economic variables given the government has access to a rich debt structure is identical to the set of equilibrium outcome paths given the government can issue only one-period debt.

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On the irrelevance of the maturity structure of government debt without commitment

Abstract

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