On the irrelevance of the maturity structure of government debt without commitment

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper presents a government debt game with the property that if the timing of debt auctions within a period is sufficiently unfettered, the set of equilibrium outcome paths of real economic variables given the government has access to a rich debt structure is identical to the set of equilibrium outcome paths given the government can issue only one-period debt.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)115-128
Number of pages14
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume46
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2004

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Maturity
Government debt
Government
Debt
Economic variables
Auctions
Debt structure

Cite this

On the irrelevance of the maturity structure of government debt without commitment. / Phelan, Christopher.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 46, No. 1, 01.01.2004, p. 115-128.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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