This paper considers the possibility for aggregation of preferences in engineering design. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem applies to the aggregation of individuals' (ordinal) preferences defined over a finite number of alternative designs. However, when the design space is infinite and when all individuals have monotone preferences or have von Neumann-Morgenstern (cardinal) utilities defined over lotteries, possibility results are available. Alternative axiomatic frameworks lead to additional aggregation procedures for cardinal utilities. For these results about collaborative design, aggregation occurs with respect to decision makers and not attributes, although some of the possibility results preserve additive separability in attributes.
|Original language||English (US)|
|Number of pages||11|
|State||Published - 2001|
|Event||2001 ASME Design Engineering Technical Conference and Computers and Information in Engineering Conference - Pittsburgh, PA, United States|
Duration: Sep 9 2001 → Sep 12 2001
|Other||2001 ASME Design Engineering Technical Conference and Computers and Information in Engineering Conference|
|Period||9/9/01 → 9/12/01|
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
This work was partially supported by the National Science Foundation through research grants DMI-9816144 and DMI-0070257. Three reviewers made some useful detailed comments.
This work was partially supported by the National Science Foundation through research grants DMI-9816144 and DM1-0070257. Three reviewers made some useful detailed comments.
- Arrow Impossibility Theorem
- Decision-based design
- Engineering design
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern (cardinal) utilities