On the aggregation of preferences in engineering design

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperpeer-review

18 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper considers the possibility for aggregation of preferences in engineering design. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem applies to the aggregation of individuals' (ordinal) preferences defined over a finite number of alternative designs. However, when the design space is infinite and when all individuals have monotone preferences or have von Neumann-Morgenstern (cardinal) utilities defined over lotteries, possibility results are available. Alternative axiomatic frameworks lead to additional aggregation procedures for cardinal utilities. For these results about collaborative design, aggregation occurs with respect to decision makers and not attributes, although some of the possibility results preserve additive separability in attributes.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages57-67
Number of pages11
StatePublished - 2001
Event2001 ASME Design Engineering Technical Conference and Computers and Information in Engineering Conference - Pittsburgh, PA, United States
Duration: Sep 9 2001Sep 12 2001

Other

Other2001 ASME Design Engineering Technical Conference and Computers and Information in Engineering Conference
CountryUnited States
CityPittsburgh, PA
Period9/9/019/12/01

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
This work was partially supported by the National Science Foundation through research grants DMI-9816144 and DMI-0070257. Three reviewers made some useful detailed comments.

Keywords

  • Arrow Impossibility Theorem
  • Decision-based design
  • Engineering design
  • Von Neumann-Morgenstern (cardinal) utilities

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