New privacy-preserving ascending auction for assignment problems

De Liu, Adib Bagh

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We introduce a new ascending auction that allocates heterogeneous objects among bidders with purely private unit demands. Our auction design differs from existing dynamic auctions in a number of ways: it economizes on information solicited from bidders by requiring marginal bidders to reveal a single new bid at a time; it uses a transparent price adjustment process; and it allows the seller to set starting prices above his reservation valuations. Despite these new features, (i) the auction stops in a finite time, (ii) sincere bidding is an ex-post Nash equilibrium, (iii) the auction ending prices and revenue depend only on bidders valuations and starting prices, and (iv) the auction is efficient if it starts with the seller's valuations.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication25th Annual Workshop on Information Technologies and Systems, WITS 2015
PublisherUniversity of Texas at Dallas
StatePublished - Jan 1 2015
Event25th Annual Workshop on Information Technologies and Systems, WITS 2015 - Dallas, United States
Duration: Dec 12 2015Dec 13 2015

Other

Other25th Annual Workshop on Information Technologies and Systems, WITS 2015
CountryUnited States
CityDallas
Period12/12/1512/13/15

Keywords

  • Algorithm
  • Ascending auctions
  • Assignment problem
  • Privacy preservation

Cite this

Liu, D., & Bagh, A. (2015). New privacy-preserving ascending auction for assignment problems. In 25th Annual Workshop on Information Technologies and Systems, WITS 2015 University of Texas at Dallas.

New privacy-preserving ascending auction for assignment problems. / Liu, De; Bagh, Adib.

25th Annual Workshop on Information Technologies and Systems, WITS 2015. University of Texas at Dallas, 2015.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Liu, D & Bagh, A 2015, New privacy-preserving ascending auction for assignment problems. in 25th Annual Workshop on Information Technologies and Systems, WITS 2015. University of Texas at Dallas, 25th Annual Workshop on Information Technologies and Systems, WITS 2015, Dallas, United States, 12/12/15.
Liu D, Bagh A. New privacy-preserving ascending auction for assignment problems. In 25th Annual Workshop on Information Technologies and Systems, WITS 2015. University of Texas at Dallas. 2015
Liu, De ; Bagh, Adib. / New privacy-preserving ascending auction for assignment problems. 25th Annual Workshop on Information Technologies and Systems, WITS 2015. University of Texas at Dallas, 2015.
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