Near-efficient allocation using artificial currency in repeated settings

Artur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee, Krishnamurthy Iyer

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

1 Scopus citations


We study the design of mechanisms without money for repeated allocation of resources among competing agents. Such mechanisms are gaining widespread use in allocating computing resources in universities and companies, and also distributing of public goods like vaccines among hospitals and food donations among food banks. We consider repeated allocation mechanisms based on artificial currencies, wherein we first allot each agent a chosen endowment of credits, which they can then use over time to bid for the item in a chosen auction format. Our main contribution is in showing that a simple mechanism, based on a repeated all-pay auction with personalized endowments and static pricing rules, simultaneously guarantees vanishing gains from nontruthful bidding as well as vanishing loss in efficiency. Our work lies at the intersection of dynamic mechanism design and mechanisms without money, and the techniques we develop here may prove of independent interest in these settings.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationWeb and Internet Economics - 12th International Conference, WINE 2016, Proceedings
EditorsAdrian Vetta, Yang Cai
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Number of pages2
ISBN (Print)9783662541098
StatePublished - Jan 1 2016
Externally publishedYes
Event12th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2016 - Montreal, Canada
Duration: Jun 11 2016Jul 14 2016

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume10123 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349


Conference12th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2016

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