Mutual information jammer-relay games

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26 Scopus citations


We consider a two-person zero-sum mutual information game between one jammer (J) and one relay (R) in both nonfading and fading scenarios. Assuming that the source (S) and the destination (D) are unaware of the game, we derive optimal pure or mixed strategies for J and R depending on the link qualities and whether the players are active during the S → D channel training. In nonfading scenarios, when both J and R have full knowledge of the source signal, linear jamming (LJ) and linear relaying (LR) are shown optimal in the sense of achieving Nash equilibrium. When the S → J and S → R links are noisy, LJ strategies (pure or mixed) are still optimal under LR. In this case, instead of always transmitting with full power as when the S → R link is perfect, R should adjust the transmit power according to its power constraint and the reliability of the source signal it receives. Furthermore, in fading scenarios, it is optimal for J to jam only with Gaussian noise if it cannot determine the phase difference between its signal and the source signal. When LR is considered with fading, TZ should forward with full power when the S → R link is better than the jammed S → D link, and defer forwarding otherwise. Optimal parameters are derived based on exact Nash equilibrium solutions or upper and lower bounds when a closed-form solution cannot be found.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number4483673
Pages (from-to)290-303
Number of pages14
JournalIEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Issue number2
StatePublished - Jun 1 2008


  • Jammer channel
  • Mutual information
  • Nash equilibrium (NE)
  • Relay channel
  • Two-person zero-sum games

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