Multiagent route choice game for transportation engineering

Di Xuan, X. Liu Henry, David M. Levinson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

In undergraduate transportation engineering courses, traffic assignment is a difficult concept for instructors to teach and for students to learn because the concept involves advanced mathematical modeling and computations. A multiplayer game, called multiagent route choice, is designed to engage students in making route choices so that they can visualize how traffic gradually reaches a user equilibrium. In addition, the Braess paradox phenomenon, a concept not generally taught in undergraduate transportation courses, is embedded in the game for students to explore. A before-and-after comparison and a case-control study are performed to evaluate the effectiveness of the game as a curriculum tool. The impact of students' learning preferences is also investigated.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)55-63
Number of pages9
JournalTransportation Research Record
Volume2480
DOIs
StatePublished - 2015

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