Multi-attribute procurement auctions with risk averse suppliers

Shulin Liu, Jun Li, De Liu

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

14 Scopus citations


We analyze multi-attribute procurement auctions with risk-averse suppliers. As the number of suppliers increases or the suppliers become more risk-averse, the equilibrium bidding price decreases under the first-score auction but remains the same under the second-score auction. A buyer prefers the first-score auction.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)408-411
Number of pages4
JournalEconomics Letters
Issue number3
StatePublished - Jun 2012

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
The authors wish to thank Professor Eric Maskin and the anonymous reviewers for valuable comments. This research is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No. 71171052 .

Copyright 2012 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.


  • Multi-attribute auctions
  • Procurement auctions
  • Risk aversion


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