Banks face liquidity and capital pressures that favor selling off the loans they originate, but loan sales undermine their monitoring incentives. A bank's loan default history is a noisy measure of its past monitoring choices, which can serve as a reputation mechanism to incentivize current monitoring. In equilibrium, higher reputation banks monitor (weakly) more intensively; if retention is credible, they generally retain less of the loans they originate. Monitoring is difficult to sustain in periods with uncommonly large spikes in loan demand ("booms"), especially for low-reputation banks, which are more likely to accommodate boom demand and forgo monitoring.
|Original language||English (US)|
|Number of pages||47|
|Journal||Review of Financial Studies|
|State||Published - Dec 1 2021|
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