Micro-foundations of congestion and pricing: A game theory perspective

David Levinson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

63 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper develops congestion theory and congestion pricing theory from its micro-foundations, the interaction of two or more vehicles. Using game theory, with a two-player game it is shown that the emergence of congestion depends on the players' relative valuations of early arrival, late arrival, and journey delay. Congestion pricing can be used as a cooperation mechanism to minimize total costs (if returned to the players). The analysis is then extended to the case of the three-player game, which illustrates congestion as a negative externality imposed on players who do not themselves contribute to it.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)691-704
Number of pages14
JournalTransportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice
Volume39
Issue number7-9
DOIs
StatePublished - 2005

Keywords

  • Congestion
  • Congestion pricing
  • Game theory
  • Queueing
  • Road pricing
  • Traffic flow
  • Value pricing

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Micro-foundations of congestion and pricing: A game theory perspective'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this