Tor provides low-latency anonymous and uncensored network access against a local or network adversary. Due to the design choice to minimize traffic overhead (and increase the pool of potential users) Tor allows some information about the client’s connections to leak. Attacks using (features extracted from) this information to infer the website a user visits are called Website Fingerprinting (WF) attacks. We develop a methodology and tools to measure the amount of leaked information about a website. We apply this tool to a comprehensive set of features extracted from a large set of websites and WF defense mechanisms, allowing us to make more fine-grained observations about WF attacks and defenses.
|Original language||English (US)|
|Title of host publication||CCS 2018 - Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security|
|Publisher||Association for Computing Machinery|
|Number of pages||16|
|State||Published - Oct 15 2018|
|Event||25th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2018 - Toronto, Canada|
Duration: Oct 15 2018 → …
|Name||Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security|
|Other||25th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2018|
|Period||10/15/18 → …|
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
We would like to thank Tao Wang, Marc Juarez, Michael Carl Tschantz, Vern Paxson, George Karypis, Sheng Chen for the helpful discussions which improved this paper. We thank Marc Juarez et al. for helping us on Tor Browser Crawler. Shuai specially thanks his wife Wen Xing for her support and valued encouragement in this work. This paper is supported by NSF 1314637 and NSF 1815757.
© 2018 Association for Computing Machinery.
- Website fingerprinting